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Resumen: En muchos países se ha puesto de manifiesto que para po-
der superar de forma rápida y eficiente la crisis del mercado financiero 
era necesaria la intervención estatal. Con el objetivo de evitar daños a la 
economía austriaca, se ha adoptado un paquete de medidas que permi-
tan mantener la estabilidad del sector financiero nacional. Para interven-
ciones directas Austria ha creado un fondo de rescate de cien mil millo-
nes de euros. Además, también se contemplan una serie de regulaciones 
complementarias que no requieren de fondos específicos. En este trabajo 
se exponen conjuntamente todas las medidas y reformas legislativas que 
se han llevado a cabo hasta la fecha en Austria para hacer frente a la crisis 
del mercado financiero.
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Abstract: In the course of the turmoil of the financial market it 
became clear that for quickly and efficiently tackling it, governmental 
interventions were necessary in numerous countries. To save the 
Austrian economy from damage, a bundle of measures was brought 
up. Due to this the stability of the domestic financial sector could be 
preserved. Austria has intended a budget of EUR 100 billion for direct 
interventions. Additionally there are a couple of regulations which did 
1 This article is based on the transcript of the Author’s lecture on “Austrian Measures against the 
Financial Market Crisis” at the Universidad de Alcalá, Alcalá de Henares (Madrid) on 26th May 
2009. It partly is derived from the Author’s work “Finanzmarktstabilisierung: Das österreichische 
Maßnahmenpaket”, published in ZFR 2009, 50.
478 Alexander Putzer
Anuario Facultad de Derecho – Universidad de Alcalá II (2009) 477-500
not afford an own budgeting. All these measures taken up to now are 
referred to here in common as the Austrian legal measures against the 
financial turmoil.
Keywords: financial turmoil, liquidity, re-capitalisation
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I. Initial position
The words “crisis” and “turmoil” since 2007 experience high 
attention in the financial industry. The financial turmoil which appeared 
worldwide in different intensity was pushed by the subprime crisis 
released in the U.S.A. Since that time in many places it has questioned 
the stability of the financial sector as well as the trust of the investors.
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What followed the crisis was her political analysis and that of the 
possible effects. The welcome result were internationally co-ordinated 
reactions which were not only necessary overall, but also effective and 
useful.
The first reaction on the financial turmoil in the form of politically 
formed and governmentally carried out measures was worked out in 
the USA. In Europe the countries under the aegis of the EU agreed on 
obeying the measure bundle developed by the committee of the G7. This 
bundle in particular includes the support of system-relevant financial 
institutions, the prevention and resolving of a credit crunch2 and the 
strengthening of the deposit-guarantee systems.
On the basis of this abstract bundle the single states compiled 
and decided on own, measures and regulations, which gave respect to 
national crisis scenarios and corresponding challenges. Thus the Austrian 
parliament concerned with the protection of the financial market 
stability and the reputation of the Austrian banks3 to federal law gazette 
No. I 2008/136 published the central bundle of measures including the 
so called FinStaG (Act on the Financial Market Stability) and the IBSG 
(Act on Strengthening of the Interbank Market). However, there have 
been quite a number of additional regulative measures, which will also 
be shown here.
Bringing the current financial market situation in Austria to the 
point, it can be stated that there are various signs of a moderate recovery. 
Especially a credit crunch can not be observed in Austria. The data 
published by the OeNB (Austrian National Bank) shows that at no time 
since the breakout of the turmoil Austria’s economy suffered from such 
a crunch.
Basically the same can be stated concerning the whole Euro Area. 
Although in some countries signs of credit crunches appeared and even 
became manifest in some cases, yet no serious credit crunches occurred.
As the last “Euro Area Bank Lending Survey” of the ECB – the 
European Central Bank – shows, the demand for loans to households4 
as well as the demand for loans and credit lines to enterprises5 in general 
is actually rising again in Europe. Correspondingly the restrictions in 
2 See Mitterlehner/Nowotny/Leitl/Sorger/Pinkl/Prehofer/Sevelda/Uher, „Kreditklemme“ – real 
oder gefühlt?, ÖBA 2009, 1.
3 Governmental Draft 682 BlgNR 23. GP 2.
4 ECB, The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey – April 2009 (2009) 8.
5 ECB, The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey – April 2009 (2009) 20.
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credit standards for the approval of loans/credit lines to households and 
to enterprises are being lowered again since the beginning of the first 
quarter of 2009.6
II. A european framework in the fields of competition law7
Not surprisingly the legal measures discussed in this context were 
and still are subject to assessment by the European Commission under 
the perspective of the competition law.
The EU competition law serves to prevent undesirable distortions of 
competition between Member States. This includes – according to Art 
87 and the following of the EC Treaty – the control of state aid.
Such aid is available if the state plans to support a private company 
and this support leads to a disturbance of the competition with 
competitors from other Member States or at least threatens to distort 
competition.8 Since it is the primary object of the Austrian legal measures 
against the financial turmoil, there is no question that the corresponding 
governmental actions support private companies. And the financial 
dimensions of the measures superfluous the question of the potential for 
a disturbance of the European competition. The Austrian legal measures 
were therefore subject to an examination by the European Commission.
Since this was already expected from the outset, the wording of the 
Austrian legal measures was already chosen with a conscious look at the 
wording of the relevant articles of the EC Treaty.9
For the examination of such measures the EU Commission has 
established a framework of official communications. Based on the 
current guidelines of 2004 for rescue and restructuring aid, the on 13th 
October 2008 it published new guidelines to serve for the design of 
measures which deal with the financial turmoil. These guidelines consist 
of the communications from the commission on “The application of 
State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in 
the context of the current global financial crisis”10 and adjoined to this 
6 ECB, The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey – April 2009 (2009) 8; 14.
7 With details Arhold, Globale Finanzkrise und europäisches Beihilfenrecht – Die (neuen) Spiel-
regeln für Beihilfen an Finanzinstitute und ihre praktische Anwendung, EuZW 2008, 713.
8 See Streinz, Europarecht8 (2008) Rz 1020 ff; also Peyerl, EG-Beihilfenverbot und Steuerrecht, 
JAP 2008/2009, 26.
9 See Governmental Draft RV 682 BlgNR 23. GP 3 and Committee Report 683 BlgNR 23. GP 3.
10 Official Journal of the European Union C 270/8, 25.10.2008.
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the Commission communications “Temporary framework for State 
aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial and 
economic crisis”11 and “The re-capitalisation of financial institutions in 
the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary 
and safeguards against undue distortions of competition”12 and finally 
the communication “on the Treatment of Impaired Assets in the 
Community Banking sector”.13
This framework makes it clear that the current relevant measures and 
regulations of the Member States according to Article 87 subparagraph 
3 litter b of the EC Treaty are to be regarded as compatible with the 
common market, if they are designed reasonably. According to the 
provision named, state aid is permitted, when it is necessary “to remedy 
a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”.
These new guidelines are therefore now the basis for the assessment 
of projects of the Member States. The Austrian measure bundle was 
approved by the EU Commission on 9th December 200814 and entered 
into the State Aid Register under the number N  557/2008. One of 
the most prominent aspects of the public debate, the remuneration 
of re-capitalisation measures, is dealt with under paragraph 92 and 
the following of the decision of the Commission. It is noted that the 
state through the coupon and repayment terms will be awarded with a 
minimum yield of 9,1% to 9,3% expected, and also yields well over 10% 
are possible.15 It should be noted that this high rate is one of the main 
factors for the tentative adoption and implementation of the stability 
measures in Austria.
On the fringes it should be mentioned that the Commission under 
the competitive examination did not assess the whole bundle of legal 
measures, but has only reviewed the IBSG and the FinStaG. Other 
proposed measures, such as the increased deposit-guarantee to SMEs, are 
basically not capable of causing serious competition-distorting effects.
In the fight against the financial turmoil the EU Commission 
by now has approved nearly 50 support- and stabilisation efforts of 
11 Consolidated version: Official Journal of the European Union C 83/1, 7.4.2009.
12 Official Journal of the European Union C 10/2, 15.1.2009.
13 Dated 25.2.2009, published actually under URL http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/
financial_services/financial_crisis_news_en.html.
14  „K(2008) 8408 endgültig“, 9. 12. 2008.
15  „K(2008) 8408 endgültig“, 9. 12. 2008, marginal 95.
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national governments. And still a couple of relevant national actions are 
considered for an examination by the EU Commission.16
III. Overview of the legal measures against the financial turmoil
The central elements of the legal measures for Austrian financial 
market stability happen to be the Act on Strengthening of the Interbank 
Market (IBSG) and the Act on the Financial Market Stability (FinStaG) 
whose protective purpose is „the public interest in the preservation of 
the economical stability“.17
To efficiently provide for this purpose, the Austrian legislator follows 
the core strategies of18
strengthening interbank liquidity (primarily by the IBSG),
offering opportunities for re-capitalisation (by the FinStaG) and 
recovering the trust of private and institutional investors in the 
financial markets (primarily via adaption of the deposit-guarantee-
system).
As an additional precaution and even as a beginning of a realignment 
of the legal framework the supervision of financial institutions is already 
strengthened.
Beside the issuance of the IBSG and the FinStaG amongst others 
the Banking Act, the Insurance Supervisory Act, the Stock Exchange 
Act, and the Act governing the Financial Market Authority have been 
adapted in 2008.19
In addition to these legal acts up to now the following federal 
regulations have been remitted:
Short selling prohibition order (“LVV”, federal law gazette II 
2008/375), 2. LVV (federal law gazette II 2008/412), first change of 
the 2. LVV (federal law gazette II 2009/27) and second change of the 2. 
LVV (federal law gazette II 2009/121);
federal regulation on the definition of closer regulations concerning 
the conditions and requirements for measures under the FinStaG and 
16 See EU-MEMO/09/174, 22.4.2009.
17 Committee Report 683 BlgNR 23. GP 2.
18 https://www.bmf.gv.at/Finanzmarkt/ManahmenpaketzurSic_9175/_ start.htm.
19 See Dallmann/Reich-Rohrwig, Staatshilfe für Banken, ecolex  2008, 1076; further ZFR 
2008/137, 239.
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the IBSG (federal law gazette II 2008/382; in the following referred to 
as Regulation on Conditions).
IV. Liquidity care (IBSG)
The Austrian legislator with the IBSG wants to ease the threat of a 
credit crunch. By this tribute is paid to the awareness that liquidity care 
and liquidity passing on have to be made substantially easier to preserve 
the Austrian economy from the stranglehold of a credit crunch.
1. Measures of liquidity care
The IBSG enables credit institutions, insurance companies and their 
legal special interest groups to found – as an owner – a company which 
provides for the organisation of liquidity exchange in the financial sector. 
A co-ownership of the state is not intended by law.
But the state may provide for general guarantees and concrete 
liabilities for this company.
The budget for the voluntary20 measures under the IBSG amounts 
to a total of EUR  75 billion. This budget was not split on the single 
intended measures, it is available as a global budget. Interest and expenses 
will not be credited on the budget exploitation.21
2. Austrian Clearingbank AG
As such a “liquidity clearing institution” the Austrian Clearingbank 
AG (OeCAG) was established.22 Concerning liabilities of this special 
bank the Federal Minister for Finances has pronounced duty for a 
general liability buy-out of the state. This duty is actually limited by 
EUR 4 billion.23 It is valid for a fixed period for all transactions which are 
entered into by the Clearingbank within the scope of its duties until 31st 
December 2009. Correspondingly the Clearingbank must fulfil special 
reporting duties according to the IBSG.
20 § 1 Par 5 IBSG.
21 § 3 IBSG.
22 Details in Dallmann/Reich-Rohrwig, Staatshilfe für Banken, ecolex 2008, 1076; see also http://
www.clearingbank.at/.
23 See http://www.clearingbank.at/de/haftungstraeger/seiten/default. aspx.
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For actions of the Clearingbank the following basic conditions are 
fixed by paragraph 1 subparagraph 2 and 3 of the IBSG:
Services have to be available to all beneficiaries under the same 
conditions; such beneficiaries are credit institutes according to the 
Banking Act and insurance companies according to the Insurance 
Supervisory Act;
the Clearingbank is allowed to assign another bank with conducting 
the services of the Clearingbank and
a market-compliant remuneration has to be settled for services of 
the Clearingbank.
3. Guarantees for debentures
In addition it is also provided for, that the Federal Minister for 
Finances can assume a state liability for so-called “other bond issues” of 
financial institutions according to the Banking Act.
These liabilities have to be assumed in accordance with the strict 
liability assumption rules of the FinStaG – which I will refer to in detail 
later. And the term of the relevant emissions may not exceed five years.
This option for refinancing banks and strengthening their liquidity 
care has already been used a couple of times successfully by the largest 
banks in Vienna.
This frame can expressly be used to provide issues of commercial 
papers, the single issue of loans and issues of loans within special 
programmes (e.g. MTN-programmes) with an irrevocable guarantee of 
the state.24 The Clearingbank itself is currently planning the issuance of 
commercial papers with such a guarantee of the state.
4. Stipulation of a time limit of the IBSG
The IBSG by law expires on the 31. December 2009. This temporal 
limitation clearly expresses the character of this Act as a temporal crisis 
intervention. Measures taken up to this time, especially the assumption 
of liabilities as well as the founding up of the Clearingbank will prevail 
beyond this.
24 See https://www.bmf.gv.at/Finanzmarkt/ManahmenpaketzurSic_9175/ aBelebungdesInter-
ba_9176/BundeshaftungfrWert_9183/_start.htm.
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V. Re-capitalisation (FinStaG)
For the economic continuance as well as especially for the ability 
to be able to repulse an acquisition-attempt, the core capital rate of a 
financial institution is a central factor.25
The financial turmoil internationally originated action demand in 
this area. And the not simultaneous support of financial institutions 
in Europe and in the USA by the local governments by measures 
which affected their core capital rate caused additional pressure in the 
international sphere.26
Hence, it is the aim of the FinStaG to protect and strengthen the 
core capital rate of domestic banks as an essential indicator for their 
economic stability. The corresponding measures, which will be shown 
here in detail, can moreover serve as the central instruments for the 
realisation of the political promise to protect system relevant banks from 
failure if necessary.27
1. Measures of re-capitalisation
In compliance with the relevant specifications of European law 
measures according to the FinStaG can be granted to credit institutes 
and insurance companies when this is necessary to prevent a substantial 
disturbance of the economic life, the national economic balance or 
a special protective demand of the Austrian national economy from 
occurring. The measures, which can even lead to nationalisation of 
financial institutions, will be shown in the following.
The adaptable budget frame for these measures amounts to EUR 15 
billion. This sum may be increased by any amount of the IBSG-budget 
that has not been called for. By this a maximum budget for the FinStaG-
measures of EUR 90 billion is possible.28
25 Critically Wolfgring, Was ist Eigenkapital der Banken in der Krise eigentlich wert?, ÖBA 
2008, 847.
26 See Herbst, Auf Einkaufstour in der Finanzmarktkrise, Die Presse 4. 11. 2008.
27 See BMF, Ergebnisse des ECOFIN-Rates am 8. 10. 2008 in Luxemburg (2008).
28 § 2 Par 4 FinStaG.
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2. Instruments of the FinStaG
The instruments – on whose application the Federal Minister for 
Finance decides – are
debtor-sided and creditor-sided liability acquisitions (especially by 
guarantees and debt accession),
advances and supplies of capital resources,
the investor-sided participation in capital increases,
the acquisition of shares and
the acquisition of assets of a company by fusion.
Should the above named measures not be sufficient in a case and 
should it therefore be necessary for averting a heavy economical damage, 
the acquisition of a company through the state can be arranged by a 
federal regulation of the Federal Minister for Finance, ordering the 
expropriation.
Within the scope of the investor-sided participation in capital 
increases the federal state actually has already acquired so-called 
participation capital of the largest banks in Austria. This acquisition was 
regarded necessary to rise the core capital ratio of these banks to a level 
of round about 9 % (before this the ratio was between 7 and 8 %).
The prices for this form of the support besides a market-compliant 
remuneration are additional conditions concerning the dividend politics 
towards present owners to ensure an adequate use of the capital. On the 
other hand the participation capital does not go along with voting rights 
concerning the companies – so the state has become only what is called 
a silent partner.
The possibility of company acquisition and expropriation goes 
hand in hand with the duty of the government to ensure the immediate 
re-privatisation of the relevant companies. The corresponding legal 
provision is laid out merely to initiate the re-privatisation if the necessity 
in terms of FinStaG has become obsolete. Due to this the state could be 
forced to initiate the re-privatisation mistimed. The economic interests 
of the state here by law remained on the distance.
However, the legal materials refer to this topic and they state, that the 
re-privatisation also has to regard the economic interests of the Austrian 
state.29 So in case the re-privatisation could perhaps be as profitable to 
29 Governmental Draft 682 BlgNR 23. GP 3.
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the state as the one that followed the banking crisis in Sweden in the 
early 1990s.
3. Conditions and requirements for the re-capitalisation and also for 
emission liability according to the IBSG
Legal entities, which take up measures of re-capitalisation, have 
to fulfil corresponding conditions and requirements laid down in the 
FinStaG. The 10-points frame given in the law is concretised by the 
Regulation on Conditions issued by the Federal Minister for Finance. 
By virtue of reference this default is valid also for the liability acquisition 
for special issues according to the IBSG.
The legal frame expands from default for the business-political 
adjustments (e.g. granting of credit to SME, avoidance of distortions of 
competition) and the usage of the supplied capital over aspects pertaining 
to labour law (like the compensation of organs and the workplace 
protection) up to regulations concerning core capital equipment and 
dividend distribution.
With regard to the threat of a credit crunch high public attention 
is paid to the grant of credit to SME. Their situation is regarded as an 
especially significant indicator for the whole economic situation and 
the danger of a recession. Here in contrast to the reorganisation of the 
deposit-guarantee (which I will refer to later) the legislator abstained 
from a legal definition of the concept of the “SME” in favour to preserve 
flexibility. However, this also opens a certain legal uncertainty which up 
to now has not been reduced.
Concerning the conditions and requirements discussed intensively 
worldwide, which are established for the granting of support to banks 
and insurance companies in the current context, the Austrian Federal 
Minister for Finance issued the Regulation on Conditions. In case 
a legal entity receives support from the state, the Federal Minister for 
Finance has to safeguard that the adequate of these possible conditions 
and requirements will be imposed.
The requirements – which are even further concretised within the 
scope of actual capital granting30 – are
30 § 1 Par 2 of the Regulation on Conditions.
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the adjustment of the business policy with regard to lastingness and 
possible reductions of risk-loaded positions;
specifications concerning the use of the capital granted; this with 
special focus on the grant of credit to SME and the mortgage loan 
allocation to households; however, restrictions given by the business 
object of the legal entity will be regarded;
the review of the compensation systems on incentive effects which 
tempt into immoderate risks; if necessary these systems have to be 
adjusted as far as it is allowed under civil law;
the adjustment of the compensation systems in general to an adequate 
level, especially concerning the sales of organs, company representatives 
and the top executives; in this context high attention is paid to aim 
arrangements;31
the review and adaptation of the company’s core capital equipment;
the restriction of dividend-payment and other distributions to an 
adequate level;
the adequate consideration on a workplace protection;
the avoidance of distortions of competition;
and detailed default concerning the remunerations which have to be 
paid to the state for his performances.
Besides all this the Regulation on Conditions also orders for duties 
of information towards the Federal Minister for Finances. And there is 
also a regulation offering the possibility of formal obligations instead of 
contractual regulations about the conditions and requirements.
However, what is striking is the indefiniteness of the Regulation on 
Conditions. This becomes obvious by the frequent relation to the term 
of the “appropriateness of measures”, while the legislator refuses to lend a 
face to the appropriateness.
Due to this these regulations in particular cases can be laid out as far 
or as closely as it is intended by the executive organ. This on the one hand 
opens constitutional-juridical questions. And on the other hand it creates 
the need for intensive discussions on the interpretation of the concept 
of the regulations in every single case, which definitely slows down the 
implemantation of the legal measures against the financial turmoil. 
Up to now, this state of indefiniteness has not been given a change.
31 § 4 Par 3 of the Regulation on Conditions.
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VI. Common aspects of the IBSG and the FinStaG
In the same manner in the IBSG as well as in the FinStaG it is 
envisaged, that the Federal Minister for Finance has to hand in a 
quarterly report on the execution and the effects of these Acts to the 
National Council.
Further it is common to both laws that the liabilities, which the state 
enters into towards a legal entity, without his approval may be transferred 
neither contractual, nor may be impounded. By this it is provided for 
that the state may remain in control over the fact towards whom he 
becomes a debtor.
VII. Deposit-Guarantee
1. Recent changes
While in quiet periods of financial market it leads a shadowy 
existence, the deposit-guarantee in turbulent phases as the current 
experiences exceptional attention.
Particular importance will be given to it as a psychological moment. 
The absence of just such a deposit-guarantee in 1929 and the following 
period of economic depression drove the chain of bank failures in the U.S. 
As a consequence of a strong investor panic32 at that time approximately 
5.000 Banks only in the United States collapsed. By today since the 
breakout of the crisis only slightly more than 60 U.S.-banks have failed.33
In 2006 in the scope of a review of the Deposit-Guarantee-Directive34 
the EU Commission has stated that the security limit of EUR 20.000,00 
was reasonable and sufficient.35 But due to the effects and threats of 
the financial turmoil some European countries adapted their systems 
of deposit-guarantee to strengthen the trust of the consumers towards 
the banks. Also in Austria such a “confidence building measure”36 was 
implemented.
32 See Johler/Schroth in Dellinger, BWG § 93 Rz 1 f; Schroth, Einlagensicherung (2003) 16.
33 According to the data of the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) published under 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (28th May 2009).
34 Directive 94/19/EG.
35 Comminucation of the Commission KOM(2006) 729 vom 27. 11. 2006; additionally ZFR 
2006/15, 54.
36 Committee Report 683 BlgNR 23. GP 2.
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The deposit-guarantee for individuals since 1st October 2008 
provides for unlimited insurance. The deposit-guarantee for legal entities 
is still up to EUR 20,000 or 90% of deposits per depositor. However, an 
exception is made, for small and medium-sized enterprises (provided for 
that they meet the criteria for SME according to the Austrian Enterprise 
Code). For the deposits of the SME the safety limit is EUR 50.000,00.
Accordingly, the contributions to the deposit-guarantee institutions 
in the course of these amendments were adapted. Thus the maximum 
contribution was increased significantly from 0,93 % of the assessment 
base to 1,5 %. The applicable assessment base is the one of the measurement 
of a bank’s credit risk.
In the case of the occurrence of a security case, the deposit-guarantee 
institution has to demand immediate proportional contributions by 
its members. This contribution, however, is limited to a maximum of 
EUR 50.000,00 per customer.37
If the fund from contributions is not sufficient for the payment 
of this EUR  50.000,00-minimum, as a backup the institution has to 
provide for an additional dept financing.38 Furthermore the Federal 
Minister for Finance has to be informed about the accumulated amount 
of the guaranteed deposits which exceed the limit of EUR  50.000. 
These deposits are directly guaranteed by the state and thus the Federal 
Minister for Finance has to provide for the appropriate funds.
For these measures EUR 10 billion have been budgeted.
2. Future of deposit-guarantee
In anticipation of the renewed European harmonization the 
unlimited deposit-guarantee for individuals in Austria is limited until the 
end of 2009.39 From 1st January 2010 the limit of guaranteed deposits is 
EUR 100.000,00 per individual. The state will be liable for the difference 
between EUR 50.000,00 and EUR 100.000,00. The deposit-guarantee 
for legal entities will remain at the current level.
37 § 93a Par 1 BWG.
38 § 93a Par 3 BWG.
39 § 103h BWG; see Committee Report 683 BlgNR 23. GP 4.
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VIII. Other accompanying measures
Apart from the central components of the new legal framework, the 
Austrian legislator provides for the following accompanying measures.
1. Authorization of the Financial Market Authority to the order of a 
capital add-on
It has already been stated that the core capital equipment of a financial 
institution is central to its economic existence and the assessment of its 
creditworthiness.
To ensure the adequacy of core capital ratios in the domestic banks 
the legislator has redesigned the so-called capital add-on as a means of 
proactive regulatory intervention.40
The Financial Market Authority is now entitled to order a specific 
increase in the core capital ratio of a bank if no reasonable limit is set to 
the banking- and credit risks of the banking institution and a short-term 
adjustment towards an adequate limitation of these risks is unlikely.
Such an order can be issued by the Financial Market Authority 
without the prior fixation of other authoritative measures.41
2. Empowerment of the Financial Market Authority on the regulation of 
short sales
The financial turmoil has once again uncovered that just in such 
market phases massive short selling may cause relevant interferences. 
In the spirit of functioning markets the Financial Market Authority 
through an adjustment of the Stock Exchange Act got a new regulation 
authorisation.
It may regulate short selling to avert adverse consequences. Each 
regulation is limited with a maximum of three months, but can be 
renewed. It must list the financial instruments covered by the measure. 
Corresponding derivatives are then covered by law. The FMA may by 
this provide that
naked short selling for these securities is prohibited, or alternatively 
that
40 Governmental Draft 682 BlgNR 23. GP 5.
41 Governmental Draft 682 BlgNR 23. GP 5.
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the short seller of listed securities has to make an announcement to 
the Financial Market Authority, or
the relevant positions have to be subject to a publication or that
the seller at the time of conclusion of the contract must demonstrably 
dispose of a certain percentage of the sold financial instruments.
Also this new regulation authorisation was already exercised in the 
shape of the LVV - extended by meantime a couple of times. Since 28th 
October 2008 naked short selling of the following instruments and their 
derivates on the spot market is prohibited in Austria:
Erste Group Bank AG,
Raiffeisen International Bank-Holding AG,
UNIQA Versicherungen AG and
Wiener Städtische Versicherung AG Vienna Insurance Group.
The only exceptions are made for short term naked short selling 
positions of market makers or specialists.
The previously issued Regulation on Transmission of Suspicions 
concerning Short Selling (SSV)42 of the Austrian Financial Market 
Authority by this has been replaced as far as a symbolic effect was sought 
by this federal regulation. The SSV orders to hand in a transmission 
stating a suspected market manipulation, when short selling orders 
exceed a limit defined as a certain quota of shares issued by an emitter.
A violation of the short selling regulations will be sanctioned as an 
administrative offence with a fine of up to EUR 75.000,00. In addition, 
to prevent a circumvention of this prohibition, the late delivery of the 
securities into the settlement system is now sanctioned much stricter.43
3. Reporting obligations of the Financial Market Authority regarding the 
FinStaG
If the Financial Market Authority is the suspicion that in relation to 
a financial institution the prerequisites for an application of the FinStaG 
are met, it must report this suspicion to the Federal Minister for Finance.
He then should provide for early action. The first objective will be 
a consultation of the affected institution. Unilateral measures, which 
42 Federal law gazette II 2008/329.
43 § 48t Par 1 Z 2 Stock Exchange Act.
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basically could be taken in application of the FinStaG, would both from 
a political as well as from an economic point of view not be preferable.
4. Amendment of valuation rules in the Insurance Supervisory Act
Along with the adoption of the first legal measures against the 
financial turmoil the National Council issued the Resolution 115/E 
(23rd GP) on the equivalent valuation of bonds in the portfolio and 
in direct funds. Further the Accounting Regulatory Committee of the 
EU Commission decided to adapt the accounting standards IAS 39 
and IFRS 7.44 According to these the federal law gazette I 2008/138 
amended the Insurance Supervisory Act.45
Specifically, it is now possible to evaluate stakes and shares in 
affiliated companies by the moderate lower of cost or market principle.46 
This also applies to stakes and shares held in a special UCITS-fund, 
which is controlled by the insurance company.
5. Future-oriented investor-compensation47
By Resolution 116/E (23rd GP) of the National Council the Federal 
Minister for Finance was invited to submit a concept for a future-
oriented investor-compensation. This resolution was answered with the 
draft 10 / ME (24 GP) to amend the Securities Market Supervision Act 
and the Banking Act.
The aim of this latest element of the Austrian legal measures 
against the effects of the financial turmoil is to restructure the investor-
compensation in a way to develop a four-pillar model. These four pillars 
consist of
an ex-ante financing of the system by annual contributions of the 
investment service providers,
temporary partial investing of these annual contributions into an 
insurance policy during in the introductory phase of the new system to 
reach an adequate coverage already from the beginning,
44 Governmental Draft 682 BlgNR 23. GP 1.
45 ZFR 2008/139, 242; see also Korinek/Harreither, Bewertungserleichterungen für Versicher-
ungsunternehmen, ecolex 2008/1089.
46 § 81 Par 2 Insurance Supervisory Act.
47 See with details Raschauer, Anlegerentschädigung neu, ZFR 2009/2, 2.
494 Alexander Putzer
Anuario Facultad de Derecho – Universidad de Alcalá II (2009) 477-500
special contributions in case of the occurrence of a compensation 
case and
the possibility of funding of the investor-compensation institution 
through state-guaranteed bonds.
In addition it is envisaged that a preventive system for early warning 
will be established. It will follow the example of the regulations for the 
deposit-guarantee, which has been formed according to the relevant 
guidelines of the EU.
IX. The Spanish Regulations in Comparison
1. Overview
Of all the countries in Middle-Europe, Spain is said to have been hit 
the most gravely by the financial turmoil.48 According to my information 
especially the real estate sector and together with it the mortgage lenders 
were really hit seriously. The mortgage crisis doubtlessly affects the 
banking sector. Nevertheless from a global and even from a European 
point of view the situation of the financial sector in Spain doesn’t seem 
to suffer form an existential crisis.
Similarly to all other European countries Spain has launched two 
major measures against the effects of the financial turmoil on the 
financial institutions:
the founding of a “Fund for Acquisition of Financial Assets from 
Financial Institutions” and
a guarantee scheme for credit institutions.
2. Fund for Acquisition of Financial Assets from Financial Institutions
Let me refer to the first of these two branches, the “Fund for 
Acquisition of Financial Assets from Financial Institutions”. When I first 
read this appellation, I instantly thought of Spain as the first European 
country installing a governmentally controlled “bad bank”.
But the Spanish acquisition fund is not working in this way. Whereas 
a bad bank would acquire the illiquid and risk carrying assets to relive a 
48 E.g. iStockAnalyst, The Financial Crisis in Spain (2009) http://www.istockanalyst.com/arti-
cle/viewarticlepaged/articleid/3210130/.
The austrian legal measures in course of the financial turmoil  495
Anuario Facultad de Derecho – Universidad de Alcalá II (2009) 477-500
bank’s balance sheet, the acquisition fund is restricted to purchase only 
highly rated and secure assets. The aim of this measure is to support 
the banking system with fresh money in order to burst or at least ease 
the credit crunch, which in Spain is stronger pronounced than in many 
other European countries.
For this purpose the fund has a budget of EUR 30 billion, which can 
be expanded to EUR 50 billion if necessary.49
The fund has two possibilities of acquisition of assets. The first one 
is to outright purchase the assets from financial institutions. To limit the 
fund’s investment risks the assets acquired this way must have an AAA-
rating. According to the Commission of the EU it is expected that the 
return for the state from this fund will be substantial.50
The second possibility of acquisition is to enter into re-purchase 
agreements (REPOs) with the financial institutions. The banks then 
have to re-purchase the relevant assets at a pre-fixed price after a certain 
time. Assets purchased this way at least must have an AA-rating.
This fund’s activities in addition will be subject to public audit and 
parliamentary control. The acquisition activities are currently notified to 
the Commission of the EU for a duration of six months (which means 
until the middle of 2009). After this period this measure can be re-
notified.
In addition it is provided for that the fund’s assets are properly 
diversified by legal regulations. E.g. the fund my not invest more than 
10 % of it’s assets in securities of the same issuer.
3. Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions
The second regulatory measure is the guarantee scheme for credit 
institutions.51 Spain has set out a budget of EUR  100 billion, which 
under special circumstances may be exceeded up to EUR 200 billion, to 
cover the issuance of notes, bonds and obligations admitted to the official 
market in Spain. This measure is only accessible to currently solvent 
49 de Valle/Comin, Spain, in Eder/Hörl/Winkler (Ed.), Finanzmarktstabilisierung in Europa/Sta-
bilising the Financial Markets in Europe (2008) 479 ff.
50 IP/08/1630, 4. November 2008; State aid decision NN54/A/2008 – Spain, public version is 
not yet available.
51IP/08/2049, 23. December 2008; State aid decision NN54/B/2008 – Spain [C(2008) 8960 
final corr.; C(2009) 3069 final; C(2009)2746 final].
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banks which have at least a share of 1/1000 of the Spanish credit market 
(according to the information provided for by the Bank of Spain).
The guarantees provided for under this measure follow these 
requirements:52
the guarantees will be granted irrevocably and unconditionally;
a waiver of the beneficium excussionis is expressed (payment even if 
the principal is still solvent);
the guarantee will cover the principal of the credit and the interest;
a market oriented premium will be charged for each guarantee;
on the date of the guarantee the guarantor can be called for both the 
principal and the interest; and
the guarantee will have no legal force, if the characteristics of the 
underlying financial instruments are modified, unless the guarantor 
gives a previous written consent.
Furthermore the maximum term of the securities guaranteed may be 
five years.
The framework of this guarantee scheme is currently limited to 
31. December 2009. Also here the character of a short termed crisis 
intervention of the legal measures is shown.
4. Deposit-Guarantee and Investor-Compensation Scheme
Another EUR 5 billion are budgeted to enhance the deposit-guarantee 
and the investor-compensation. The former amount guaranteed for was 
EUR 20.000,00 – since the end of 2008 the new amount guaranteed for 
is set to EUR 100.000,00, the same amount which will be applicable in 
Austria from 1st January 2010.
5. Conclusion
Concluding it can be remarked, that Spain as well as most of the 
other European countries, in the course of the financial turmoil has 
established legal measures to provide an improvement of the liquidity of 
financial institutions to prevent or ease a credit crunch. The measures are 
rather similar to the Austrian ones, as well as the intentions are.
52 AQUI FALTA TEXTO  
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Still it is striking that Spain has not provided for regulations 
countering the possibility of a failure of system-relevant financial 
institutions. Especially there is no preparative regulation for the case 
the crisis should become worse, like e.g. the possibility of expropriation 
of financial institutions. So Spain is – besides the strengthening of the 
deposit-guarantee – actually focussing only on measures providing 
for liquidity. This suggests that the spanish legislator does not expect 
any scenarios threatening the economic exisatance of system-relevant 
financial institutions in Spain.
This – I assume – pays tribute to the fact that due to the hitherto 
strictness of the supervising authorities the Spanish banks are still 
impressively solvent and stable.
X. International Regulatory Outlook after the Financial Turmoil
At international level several efforts are projected in relation to the 
financial turmoil, to strengthen the regulation and supervision of the 
financial market and its institutions.53
The basic tendencies point towards the regulation of financial 
markets in way to reduce speculative investing and transactions and 
to lift the supervision of market participants to an international level. 
These plans currently are merely diffuse political demands. Especially 
the intention to form a strong international supervision of market 
participants is yet an interesting suggestion but not surprisingly due 
to uncounted negotiations that are still to come the realisation of this 
project is a long time coming.
The most concrete actions that can be spotted currently are those 
concerning rating agencies, deposit-guarantee and tax havens.
1. Rating Agencies
Rating agencies are being suspected as one major culprit of the 
financial turmoil. On the one hand the offer ratings of enterprises and 
financial instruments which are the basis for an uncounted number 
53 Concerning this see Nowotny, Aktuelle Perspektiven des internationalen Bankensystems, ÖBA 
2008, 687 (690 f ); Follak, Regulatory Aspects of the Recent Turmoil in the Financial Markets, ÖBA 
2008, 533.
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of economic decisions, including loan granting decisions and even 
governmental investment decisions.
On the other hand they offer the service of advice to all enterprises – 
including advice on how ratings can be influenced positively. To prevent 
rating agencies from conflicts of interest, in the future the agencies will 
have to decide whether they want to offer public ratings or they want 
to offer the service of advice. Additionally a stricter supervision of the 
business of the rating agencies by all relevant national financial market 
authorities is planned.
These provisions and further details are supposed to become subject 
to a European regulation soon.
2. Deposit-Guarantee
In line with the existing European harmony in this area at the 
European level an adaptation of the rules for deposit-guarantee is actually 
being worked out. A first draft for these adjustments and harmonization 
can be seen in the suggestion of “COM (2008) 661 final of 15 10. 2008”. 
The main focus will be on raising the minimum deposit-guarantee level 
from EUR 20.000 to EUR 100.000 per customer – in case of natural 
[physical] persons – and on a new definition of the deposit-guarantee in 
favour of legal entities.
3. Tax Havens
Another measure for handling the financial turmoil and for re-
regulating the international financial markets is dealing more intensively 
with so called tax havens. In Europe for example Andorra, the principality 
of Liechtenstein and Switzerland are regarded as such tax havens. The aim 
of the international efforts is to open these tax havens in the expectation 
of relevant capital- and tax repatriations.
Therefore the political pressure on various countries, including 
Austria, was enhanced to lower their standards of banking secrecy and 
to intensify the tax information exchange. These actions actually are 
successful, which lead to a new progress report of the OECD, in which 
it states that there are no tax havens anymore worldwide – which means 
that the black list of tax havens is empty now. The remaining grey list 
only names those countries, which will soon implement the OECD-
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standards concerning tax information exchange towards at least 12 other 
countries.
XI. Concluding Remark
The Austrian and the Spanish legal measures against the effects of 
the financial turmoil – as well as many other similar decisions in the 
EU – basically prove to be suitable to hold back rampant effects of the 
financial turmoil.
Especially in light of the persisting stability and solvency of 
Austrian banks, it is understandable that the offered measures based 
on the new rules so far have been drawn on only in a few cases.
Conscious of this stability and solvency, the legislator has created 
the legal framework shown here not as a measure to escape from a 
crisis but rather as a framework to maintain and preserve the existing 
stability of the domestic banking and insurance sector also against 
increasing pressure.
Finally the comparison of Austrian and Spanish measures shows, 
that the challenges and the governmental reactions in both our 
countries are very similar. What is striking is the fact that Asturias 
budget for the relevant measures is EUR 100 billion, whereas Spain is 
budgeting a maximum of EUR 255 billion – just about two and a half 
times the Austrian budget. In respect of the size of the Spanish economy 
it might be necessary to further exceed the relevant budget in Spain. 
But this only affects the budgetary part; the measures themselves can 
be regarded as the accurate ones. Although the details of the regulation 
differ, the basic intentions are re-capitalisation of market participants 
and strengthening the interbank market to prevent or ease a credit 
crunch in Austria as well as in Spain. Behind these intentions there’s in 
both our countries the urgent need for the general trust in the financial 
sector to be restored.
This trust has been risked by the financial institutions themselves. 
And now our governments have to join in to restore this trust. But 
the recent governmental and industrial actions and the corresponding 
reactions of the markets give hope that the turnaround after the 
financial turmoil is actually happening right now.
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